Surviving members of Joacem Costa's family, wife Laili Costa and two daughters. (PhotoDipal Barua)

Laili Costa said, “My husband left me and my two daughters. What he earned hardly supported our family, and he did not leave any savings. The owner of our previous home had already kicked us out from there, and we had just found a second home. The owner there is going to kick us out within days. I will not be able to have Christmas with my children.”

She went on, “I am striving daily for my small children. My elder daughter was kicked out of school, since I cannot pay the tuition fees, and my younger daughter is suffering from serious malnutrition; she could die at any time.”

With extreme fear and tears in her eyes, Laili Costa said, “On July 14, 2009, around 9:35, I got a call from one of my neighbors that my husband was shot by thugs in the Sadhon Para area. I immediately called my husband’s younger brother, Leo Costa, and rushed to the place. As I reached the place, I did not find my husband. He had been taken to Dhaka Medical College Hospital.”She continued, “An eye witness said that a group of highly armed people came and shot a gun once, and my husband asked them, ‘Why you are doing this? Don’t kill me, I have a family and a wife and small kids.’ He begged, ‘For the sake of Jesus and my family, don’t kill me. What do you want?’ Then they shot three times.”

She said, “My husband fell down in the road and asked people for help, saying ‘Please take me to the hospital’ and ‘Call my family’, but no one came forward to help. I went to police, but as I cannot give a bribe, the local police officer Mohamed Moinul Islam, who is the investigation officer of the case, is not properly investigating the case.”

Leo Costa said, “I filed a case with local police. I am afraid the thugs who killed my brother may kill me also.”

Local police inspector Moinul Islam told Asia News that the killing was cloaked in mystery and police are still investigating the case.

The parish priest of Holy Rosary church said, “I heard about this sad incident, may his soul rest in peace. We have a parish with more than 20,000 Catholics who also have a lot of problems and needs. We are trying to help this Laili Costa with spiritual guidance, but we do not have the ability to help her and her kids financially.”

Catholic human rights activist Annie halder said that persecution against Catholics is growing, and that previously a family was gunned down in the Kafrul area of Dhaka.

A Catholic priest, Joseph Arsenault, the parochial vicar at St. Bridget’s Church in Abington in the Archdiocese of Boston, said about the case: “First of all, it is a shame that such a crime happened in the first place. To take a life is just wrong. Secondly, the fact that the wife, who I assume is an innocent person in all of this, becomes a victim twice. She loses her husband, and now she loses her home and means of support. As Christians, the community, I hope, is there to support her so she does not end up on the street. As Matthew’s gospel tell us, we are obliged to feed those who are in need and make sure the most vulnerable are taken care of. Justice would also demand that the killer of her husband should face the courts.”

Joseph Arsenault told, “I will be offering the Holy Sacrifice of Mass for her intentions and that of her family on Dec. 1st.”

Free Christian Churches of Bangladesh has been active for 25 years and has 320 churches and 30,500 members. The church has faced severe problems during the second Iraq War, and, at various times, evangelists were persecuted.

Police Sub-inspector Mohammed Wahid, of the Sahabag police station, said, “On Sept. 12, at around 8 p.m., I got a message that an unidentified man was found seriously wounded outside of Suhrawardi Park. I rushed to the scene and found the wounded man, and immediately took him to the Dhaka Medical College Hospital. Meanwhile, we came to learn from him that his name is Swopon Mondol and that he is a worker of Free Christian Churches of Bangladesh. His wife, Lucky Mondol, came to the hospital when she was informed about the incident. I left him at the hospital for treatment since his wife was there. Later, I came to know that Mondol died at 12:10 p.m., meaning in the early hours of Sept. 13.

“From local people, I came to know that Swopon Mondol and three or four people with him ran after some Dhaka University students over the issue of a theft. One of the students ran to the nearby campus and brought more students, who then beat Mondol brutally, until he fell down onto the floor.”

Lucky Mondol, the wife of the dead Christian evangelist, said, “My only son, Diptoo (age 10), and I rushed to the hospital. Some youth came to the hospital and wanted money, threatening me. My husband was fighting for his life, and this group of violent youths were threatening me and demanding 1400 taka, saying that my husband stole one of their mobile phones. I found myself helpless. I prayed for my husband.

“I am afraid to file a police report. Who will guarantee my safety and give me money to pay for the case? I don’t doubt that the violent people who beat my husband brutally and even came to the hospital afterward might kill me if I file a police report. And now it’s a challenge for me and my son Diptoo to even survive, because my husband was the only earning member of our family.”

Sulekha Mondol, Mondol’s sister, said, “We are so poor, and we are in the minority. My brother Swopon was very pious and very patient. He preached the good news of Christ, yet such a good man was killed like an animal. Now we are afraid, and we don’t feel safe. Many Christian evangelists have been killed, and no one has gotten justice. On Sept. 13, we buried my brother in fear and hoping for justice in our village. We could hardly arrange for the money to bury my brother and transport his body from the hospital to our village in Khulna.”

Bishop Albert P. Mirdha of Free Christian Churches of Bangladesh said, “Swopon Mondol was really a very active church worker over the last 14 years, and we are all shocked by his murder. Minorities are not safe in Bangladesh.”

Human rights activist Annie Halder said, “According to Art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,’ and, according to Art. 3, ‘everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.’ Here, we have seen that there is no security of life and that the Christian evangelist was tortured like an animal.”

Inspector Wahid said, “I have been working for the police for a long time, and when I saw Mondol, he looked like a simple and gentle man. I can’t imagine that he would steal anyone’s mobile phone. Recently, at Dhaka University, some violent students have been harassing innocent people, and, in this case, a gentle man was brutally tortured and killed. A source has told us that the group of students were from Mohasin Hall and were led by Mohammed Rajan.”

A positive change in the right direction is the highest need on the Indian subcontinent, especially for Bangladesh. The areas of society and politics are groaning for change in Bangladesh. Yet the nation has failed to see positive and lasting change in its social life and politics. The question is whether change is a choice or a challenge before the nation.

The nation of Bangladesh was born out of an armed conflict pitting West Pakistan against East Pakistan. Nine months after the war broke out, the Pakistan Army of West Pakistan surrendered at last on December 16, 1971, when the Mukti Bahini, a guerrilla force supporting East Pakistan, decisively defeated it. During the war, there were widespread killings and violations of human rights carried out by the Pakistan Army with support from political and religious militias of East Pakistan of that time. Three million people were killed, 200,000 women were tortured and raped, and the women who were raped gave birth to thousands of war babies.

Mahatma Gandhi said, “The true democrat is he who, with purely nonviolent means, defends his liberty and, therefore, his country’s and ultimately that of the whole of mankind.” It is very clear that the political regime of West Pakistan was not democratic and that the people and nations who supported them were equally liable for the brutal genocide committed against the innocent people of East Pakistan.

The nation of Bangladesh was obviously a result of a positive, dynamic change. Prominent writer Nathaniel Branden said, “The first step toward change is awareness. The second step is acceptance.” The nation of Bangladesh was created with a deep desire for secularism, but the nation has now been named as an ultra-Muslim country, as declared in the constitution itself. Almost four decades after the war for independence, all of the political parties and leaders of Bangladesh are failing to recall the principle of secularism put forth in the constitution of Bangladesh, with some politicians and political parties even fighting the removal of the declaration of Islam as the state religion from the constitution.

Once the people of Bangladesh took a strong position in ’71 to fight against sectarianism and challenged the world in the way it thought about Bangladesh. Yet now, the world still thinks of Bangladesh, not with sympathy or love, but with a fear of Islamic terrorism.

Bangladesh remains a threat to the world due to its expanding Islamic terrorism and will be one of the highest global threats in coming years. Political Islam is deeply ingrained in the way of life and politics of Bangladesh. There was a time when Bangladesh was under attack by foreigners, but now the nation is under attack from a power that controls the people and life of the nation, namely, Islam.

The minorities paid the most during the Bangladesh Liberation War, but the nation has failed to recognize their sacrifice. In almost all the ways possible, the minorities are persecuted by state-backed Islamic fascists, yet the nation has failed to secure their rights. The change is very visible. The minorities were persecuted during the Liberation War and are now being persecuted again for having a different religious faith. The war is run by Islamic fascists against secular forces.

Discrimination is highly visible if you look at the position of minorities in the state machinery. After almost four decades, not a single minority had the chance to be a prime minister or president of the nation, because of the sectarian forces out to destroy the minorities and secular forces. Recently, the government decided to change the name of the BDR for the mutiny, where more than 50 army officers were killed by the native paramilitary forces. The government said that the name of the BDR was hampered, so the name should be changed.

Bangladesh has failed greatly in various ways. The government should think about changing the name of Bangladesh. Benjamin Franklin said, “When you’re finished changing, you’re finished.” Yes, obviously if Bangladesh fails to change as a whole and move towards progressive political naturalism, the nation will face more than a BDR mutiny in the near future.

It’s time for the nation to think about whether a change for Bangladesh is a challenge or a choice before them. The nation of Bangladesh should remember the famous saying of Victor Hugo, that, “Liberation is not deliverance.”

The guilty verdict issued by Burma’s military junta against Aung San Suu Kyi has made the country’s political weather gloomier and murkier. Most citizens, including military officials, are upset at the unjust and arbitrary decision of the court. It is likely to engender more social unrest in the near future.

The verdict handed down by the Insein Prison Court on Tuesday found the Nobel laureate and key opposition leader guilty of violating the terms of her house arrest. The only significant rival to the ruling junta has been consigned to another 18 months of house arrest.

The scene in the court was very theatrical. First Thaung Nyunt, the puppet judge, stated the anticipated sentence – three years in prison with hard labor. Next, the junta’s Home Minister Maung Oo read out an order from Senior General Than Shwe, commuting the sentence to 18 months under house arrest.

Than Shwe cautiously adjusted the sentence to deliver the word that he is not a stupid villain and he does not want to quarrel with the international community. But his attempt was in vain. In essence, Than Shwe wanted the Lady to remain in custody until after the 2010 election. In fact, what both the international community and the people of Burma want is to free Aung San Suu Kyi immediately without any condition.
The verdict was strongly opposed by a group of Nobel laureates including the Dalai Lama, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. “This illegal verdict is just one more instance of the junta’s contempt for justice, security and democracy for the Burmese people,” pronounced Nobel laureate Jody Williams.

The group of Nobel laureates demanded that the U.N. Security Council investigate “war crimes and crimes against humanity” committed by the military junta that rules Burma.

The leaders of Britain, France and the United States all strongly condemned the 18-month sentence as contempt for justice and the trial as a sham. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon added his voice to renewed calls for her immediate release.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated, “This is a purely political sentence designed to prevent her from taking part in the regime’s planned elections next year.”

U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for the immediate and unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Both Obama and Clinton called on the Burmese regime to heed the views of its own people and the international community and to work toward genuine national reconciliation. Otherwise, the elections scheduled for next year will have absolutely no legitimacy.

“The EU will respond with additional targeted measures against those responsible for the verdict,” the European Union’s Swedish presidency said in a statement on behalf of the 27-nation bloc. An EU source said a “written procedure” had been launched to beef up the sanctions which could come into force as early as Friday if there was no disagreement from the bloc’s members.

European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said Aung San Suu Kyi’s continuous detention was “unjustified and unacceptable on all accounts.”

On Thursday, Thailand, as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, issued a statement calling for the immediate release of all political prisoners, including opposition leader Suu Kyi, to enable them to participate in the general election next year.

The United Kingdom supports Thailand’s call for the Burmese junta to release all political prisoners from detention, British ambassador to Thailand Quinton Quayle said after a meeting with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajira on Thursday. Quayle said the European Union and the United Nations were considering imposing sanctions that would be aimed not at Burma but at the Burmese government, especially the military.
Four U.N.-appointed human rights experts joined the calls for Suu Kyi’s immediate release. The experts said the court was biased, the charges lacked substance and the trial was illegal. The global body’s investigators for arbitrary detention, freedom of expression, human rights defenders and human rights in Myanmar (Burma) say the Nobel Peace laureate was convicted by Myanmar’s military junta in a “baseless trial” meant only to exclude her from elections next year.

Article 121 (a) of the junta’s 2008 Constitution asserts that “a person serving a prison term or having been convicted of an offence shall not be entitled to be elected as a parliamentarian.” That makes it obvious that the Lady will not be eligible to contest the upcoming election.

The time is right for the United Nations to take practical follow-up steps. The Security Council must establish a commission of inquiry into crimes against humanity and impunity in Burma. The Security Council should take similar steps with regard to Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur. The international community, led by the United Nations, should keep in mind that in a 2003 attack on Suu Kyi and her supporters, known as the Depayin incident, the junta’s chief Than Shwe was the key criminal and Suu Kyi and her supporters were the victims.
There is a strong conflict of interest between the military junta and the grassroots population. To the military autocrats, the Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi is a menace to peace and stability; to the majority population of the country the Lady represents hope of change. Her intolerable continued incarceration is not merely a matter of law and order. It represents the autocracy annihilating the political aspirations of the people of Burma, who strongly support reconciliation and change.

Another key issue is the demand of Burma’s ethnic groups to enjoy equal political, social and economic rights. The Constitution must guarantee the rights of self-determination and of equal representation for every ethnic group in the Parliament. It must also include provisions against racial discrimination.

Aung San Suu Kyi supports all such rights for the ethnic nationalities, while the military leaders are unwilling to do so. Hence this question has generated half a century of civil strife.

Although Than Shwe may be trying not to look like a villain, he is failing in that attempt. The majority of the ethnic groups hate the military and its leaders for their crimes against humanity in the ethnic areas. Suu Kyi has always denounced the military for these crimes. She is the great advocate of all ethnic nationalities in Burma.

In conclusion, Burma is at a crucial crossroads now. Than Shwe’s verdict against Aung San Suu Kyi will have an enduring impact on the unfortunate nation. This verdict will create more civil defiance and new civil wars in Burma.

All ethnic nationalities, including the Burmese, have a strong determination to fight for their freedom, justice and equality. They also know clearly that the junta’s 2010 election is a pair of iron shackles to enslave them.
Therefore, since Than Shwe has rejected the Lady’s offer of national reconciliation, it is unavoidable that he will face new challenges including civil disobedience and rebellion.

–
(Zin Linn is a freelance Burmese journalist living in exile in Bangkok, Thailand. He works at the NCGUB East Office as an information director and is vice president of Burma Media Association, which is affiliated with the Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontiers. ©Copyright Zin Linn.)

Is the state of UP ready to accept the fact that there is a problem with Uttar Police Force? Or are they comfortable condoning the acts of brutality that are becoming a frequent occurrence now. The khaki brigade is running rampant and nothing seems to be done to reign them in either.

With another custodial death taking place in Hanspura Police station in Kanpur of a labourer Jung Bahadur Singh, the incident brings home the point of how uncontrolled the law enforcers are now in state of UP. Their tyrannical attitude is more than evident in cases like the one of a small time labourer who was thrashed to death for a crime as petty as some bricks being stolen by his two minor sons.

In a serious violation of human rights the incident comes close at heels of the UP Police implicating five innocent people for torching the house of UP congress Chief Rita Bhaguna.

While not a single accused the police claim to have arrested from the spot of the crime are in any way related to the crime, there seems to be no one ready to take action against the false arrests. Though the UP Congress Chief has been openly condemning the arrests, she has demanded a CBI inquiry into the issue.

As per Akhilesh Singh, Spokesperson UP Congress, “She has also filed a petition in the Highcourt against the unlawful arrests and from August 1 we will start a jail bharo andolan if our demand for a genuine high level CBI inquiry is not granted. We have personally visited the family of the arrested and have given them our word that innocent people will not be allowed to be made scapegoats in a government sponsored crime. The police is obviously involved in the arson as well which will come to light only when a CBI inquiry is conducted.”

A fact which is also corroborated by IG SR Darapuri, retd police officer and Vice President, Public Union For Civil Liberties an human rights organization that has constituted a 5 member team to investigate the five arrests made, “The investigating team has began preparing the report. Based on our findings and I can confidently say that the arrests made are false. Innocent people have been implicated and charged with arson which can get them life imprisonment if convicted. Though the CB CID has interrogated those accused, it very obvious that they are innocent. The police have picked these five just to show that they are prompt in their action as it’s the matter of a politician from the ruling party. Infact there were no spot arrests made three people Inder Kumar, Shiv Kumar and Guddu Yadav all relatives and residents of Neel Matha, Lucknow Cantt were booked at the Sadr Cantt police station. They were brought there after they had family brawl over water. They were kept sitting at a tempo stand in Sadr where a police jeep picked them up and send them to jail. The other two were in a motor accident and went to the Hussainganj police station on their own and ended up being arrested and charged with arson under Section 436 IPC. This is the way actual culprits were allowed to go scott free.”

Stressing further on the fact that the crime the five have been booked for is a heinous crime and face very serious implications for it despite the fact that they had not committed the offense. Darapuri adds, “PUCL in its report will demand that a CBI inquiry be conducted in the matter apart from demanding a judicial inquiry as well. We will also ask for strict action against those police personnel responsible for implicating innocent people falsely. Compensation from the state will also be asked for the victims and their family who are from a very improvised background. “

Also on the agenda of the PUCL report will be scrutinizing the role of agencies like the National and State Human Rights Commission who do not play stringent role in ensuring that such serious human rights violations do not go unpunished in the country.

Adds Vandana Mishra, who is also on the five member PUCL Team constituted to investigate the matter, “The report we present will definitely help the case of the five accused to prove their innocence in the court of law. While as per our inquiry conducted there it is very obvious innocent persons are being implicated PUCL’s effort will be to ensure that no injustice is done.”

But what has caused the UP Police to take on such an autocratic stance in the state?

As per Anjali Singh, Director Saaksham Foundation, and member PUCL who is also on the investigating team of PUCL, “The Uttar Pradesh Police goes by the motto ‘Protection of Good and Destruction of the bad.’ But with the UP Police Force now topping the list of human rights violations, their motto seems to have been reversed. And when it’s the largest police force in the world, we indeed need to sit up and take stock of where the Khaki Brigade is heading as a law enforcement agency and does it take its role seriously when it comes to protecting those who are innocent. As per a study by Human Rights Features, a publication that raises the Voice of the Asia Pacific Human Rights, it came to light that the Police abuse of authority is so prevalent in Uttar Pradesh as it has an inordinate amount of power and discretion delegated to them by the legal system, the political climate and society in general. The internal reward system, which provides monetary incentives or promotions for carrying out extrajudicial executions, also acts as a catalyst. Systemic and endemic corruption in the police and within the political and judicial agencies exacerbates the problem and ensures that such crimes go unpunished.”

In short it is the poverty stricken, the dalits and illiterate sections of society, generally become sitting ducks of such a system. The lack of access to the few difficult legal remedies that actually exist further emboldens the police force that is already out of control.

Feels IB Singh, Senior Advocate ,High Court, who has been addressing such issues, “No body is above the law, not even the police. The IPC(Indian Penal Code) has numerous sections that come into effect when the rights of a citizen is violated. Though there are no separate laws drawn up in case of violations by the police, the fact remains that the existing sections are applicable on the khaki brigade as well. Section 504 IPC, Section 506, Section 323 and Section 325 IPC which deals with assault, harassment, registering fraudulent cases, corruption and extortion all can be used to bring erring police personnel to book.”
But is the BSP led state government interested in doing?

With the way things are being done in UP, it does not seem so.

It is still a question in today’s Indonesian contemporary history whether the rise of then-Lieutenant General Soeharto to power in 1966 was a matter of “historical accident” where Soeharto was created by the stage of history, or whether he created the stage himself. But by the collapse of the regime in 1998 following nationwide protests by students and people which had catapulted the black spot on the New Order helm, increasing numbers of people tried to “straighten”² and “clarify” the history. Some of them indicated the involvement of Soeharto in the 1965 abortive coup which led to the end of the power of President Soekarno, the first president.

Soeharto got sweeping support from almost all parties including students and intellectuals, as well as armies that were under his command. The new regime then fixed the bankrupt country left by its predecessor, Old Order President Soekarno (Crouch 1984:75; Robison 1997:32-3), by assuring people that the economy should be the priority in his new administration. In a relatively short time Soeharto’s New Order regime was able to stabilize the economy (Mackie 1993:76), making his potential adversaries unable to topple him. This economic success was the prime justification and legitimacy for the regime until its collapse in 1998.

It seems the dictum “l’histoire se repete”³ applied when the regime’s collapse was also caused by the economic crisis following the country’s currency collapse. The economic crisis caused sweeping hardships, especially in the countryside where people’s purchasing power fell nearly to zero.

This paper will discuss the rise and fall of Soeharto’s New Order regime, 1966-1998, which was caused by economic factors. By hypothesizing that the economy was the dominant cause of the regime’s rise as well as its fall, this paper will examine evidence that supports the argument. Sources in the form of books and media reports are in Bahasa Indonesia and English. The following sections will begin with the rise of Soeharto to power.

Genesis of the New Order Regime: When Economic Growth and Development Become Ideology

Probably the most important question concerning the rise of the New Order to power, is, if there were no bloody Communist coup on September 30, 1965, would the regime exist? Both foreign and Indonesian historians put the problem of the coup attempt as a crucial element in assessing the existence of the New Order in Indonesian modern history. It appears that the coup that threw the country into chaos was a justification for the then-Lieutenant General Soeharto to “save” the country. Saving the country was a sublime deed, and this was the oath and commitment of the armed forces.

According to history written by the New Order regime, on the night of September 30, 1965, seven army generals were killed by the Indonesian Communist Party or PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia). The intent was to paralyze the capital city of Jakarta in an attempt to rule the country. This New Order version of history was taught in schools and touted through books, the press and films; campaign mounted to brainwash people so they would accept the regime’s legitimacy. Any dissidents who tried to question or reinterpret the history were regarded as “subversive” or “Communist.” But recently, mainly after the fall of the regime, this version of the country’s history has been  questioned.

The coup attempt interpretation is still contested (this account can also be found in the work of McDonald 1980:43). Soeharto’s New Order made the PKI the scapegoat which led to the massacre of around 500,000 people identified as members of the Communist Party and affiliated with it. The rumor of the so-called Dewan Jenderal (Council of Generals) who conspired to commit the coup was part of Soeharto’s campaign to discredit the PKI. This theory says that the Dewan Jenderal conspired to rule the country by, first, killing the seven prominent generals. If this theory is true, then Dewan Jenderal is an indication of an internal problem within the army. However, this account is doubted by several researchers.

A contradictory opinion says that assessing the bloody coup attempt while ignoring the role of Soeharto is almost impossible. In an interview in Arnold Brackman’s The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, Soeharto claimed that on the night of September 30, he was treating his three-year-old son who fell sick. Soeharto said,

Two days before September 30, our three-year-old son had an accident at home. He poured hot soup on himself and we had to rush him to the hospital. Many friends visited my son there and on the night of September 30 I was there, too (May 1978:117).

W.F. Wertheim, a noted expert on Indonesia, doubted Soeharto’s claim, arguing that a military officer who was as important as Soeharto knew nothing about the coup. Lieutenant General Soeharto was the commander of the Indonesian elite force Kostrad, or the Army Reserve Strategic Command. Wertheim says,

How curious, that a man, who was one of the main plotters in the coup, and whose attention should have been fully occupied by the preparations for what was to happen that night, found time to go out of his way to enquire after the health of a little child! Suharto’s⁴ explanation that Latief probably wanted to know whether he, Suharto, the famous fighting general who had led, on the first of March, 1949, the raid on Jogja, then in Dutch hands, was so much preoccupied with the illness of his child that he could be counted upon not to interfere is too ludicrous to be taken seriously.

What matters is that the plotters, far from finding Suharto unimportant, on the contrary deemed him so important that they wanted to make sure where he stood, just before their action would start (May 1978:117-8).

A softer tone of suspicion against Soeharto’s involvement in the Communist coup attempt may be found in Schwarz’s work (2000). According to a polite Javanese-style conversation between President Soekarno and Soeharto, Soeharto himself seized power from Soekarno after the President failed to return conditions to normalcy. Amidst chaotic conditions with students flocking to the streets for demonstrations, Soeharto met President Soekarno.

… A dispirited Sukarno, President for Life, Supreme Commander, Mouthpiece of the Indonesian People, and Great Leader of the Revolution, asked plaintively: “Soeharto, what are you going to do with me? I am your leader.”

“I have always respected you as I have my parents,” Soeharto replied. “To me you are not only our national leader, but I consider you as a parent. I’d like to regard you highly but, unfortunately, you do not wish this.” It was, though clouded with typical Javanese indirection, a readily understood message that Sukarno’s days were numbered. “I was sure,” Soeharto said in a later recounting of the story, “that Sukarno knew what I meant.”

He was right. Sukarno, finally beginning to decipher the writing on the wall, asked one more time, just to be sure: “Is this true, Soeharto?”

“Yes, it’s true,” Soeharto replied (Schwarz 2000:2).

An account of the coup is contained in the so-called Cornell Paper. This interpretation held by several Indonesianists from Cornell University argued that the coup attempt was an “internal affair of the army” (Mody 1987:15). Quoting the paper, Mody said,

The coup of 1 October 1965⁵ was neither the work of PKI nor Soekarno himself… though both were deeply involved. They were more victims than the initiators of events (Ibid 1987:15).

The debate over the rise of Soeharto’s New Order — whether it was legally accepted because of the nation’s chaotic condition or because of the “hidden coup” –  became obsolete when the regime was able to fix the country’s economy. Starvation, the most frightening disaster in the third world, failed to materialize as the logical consequence of the “successful” economic development. Accompanied by the oil boom of 1973-4, the “efficient” use of foreign loans had jacked the economic growth up to seven percent (Mackie 1993:76).

The new government was busy arranging plans for development not long after it came to power. As Soeharto’s New Order was a military regime with no expertise in economics and development — it is even said that it was doubtful whether Soeharto knew what IMF was (Bresnan 1993:74)⁶ – he asked for help from several economists at the University of Indonesia. With the involvement of the academics in the development process, this period marked the  rise of what was known as “technocrats,” an elite group of scholars who had expertise in economics. This group was later known as the Berkeley Mafia – referring to their alma mater in Berkeley, University of California’s School of Economics. They included Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo, Muhammad Sadli, Emil Salim, Subroto and Widjojo Nitisastro, all of whom were professors at the University of Indonesia’s School of Economics. The “Washington factor” was suspected of playing a role behind this economic team.

This inspired the American New Leftist, David Ransom, writing in Ramparts, to brand the team as the Berkeley Mafia and to link them with a Washington conspiracy to infiltrate Indonesia both economically and politically. There is no doubt that Washington was delighted at the appointment of the team and did all in its power to ensure that the Indonesian economy was run in a way that it approved; but no evidence has been produced to justify the pejorative term, Mafia, which unfortunately has found its way into at least one learned work (May 1978:338).

This “Washington conspiracy” is widely believed, given that a strong economic advisory team was sent by the U.S. government, including the Harvard Development Advisory Service.

The first step of Soeharto’s new administration was to lower inflation in a bid to stabilize prices. Skyrocketing prices had instigated students demonstrations in Jakarta that also contributed significantly to the fall of President Soekarno. The inflation rate doubled from 1961 to 1964, increased sevenfold in 1965, and continued at the same rate in the early part of 1966 (Bresnan 1993:56). As Bresnan puts it,

One of the causes of the inflation was the persistent and growing deficit in the government budget. The deficit was related, in part, to impact of important political events. The deficit jumped in 1958, reflecting the “outer island” rebellion; again in 1961, reflecting the West Irian campaign⁷; and again in 1964, reflecting “confrontation.”⁸ On each of these occasions, the increase in the deficit was greater than it had been the time before (Bresnan 1993:56).

Only at the end of 1998 did the government succeed in controlling inflation, and over the subsequent three years it has never been greater than 10 percent (Bresnan 1993:71).

The country’s foreign debt as of December 31, 1965, during President Soekarno’s tenure, totaled $2.3 billion (Bresnan 1993:67). Poor economic performance accompanied by spiraling internal political affairs tainted Soekarno’s image in the eyes of the people at large. At that time Soekarno ignored economic development. Instead, he pushed for his leadership recognition among Third World countries. For Soekarno, politics was everything (politik sebagai panglima). In some cases, though it seemed that he developed the economy, that was not the final goal, as any measures he made were aimed at building his political image among the Third World countries. Thus, several lighthouse projects were set up although they had no direct effect for improving people’s economic condition. One of these projects was the Bandung Asia Africa Conference in 1955 which would later become the embryo of Non-Aligned Movement and South-South cooperation.

Soeharto’s technocrats totally reformed the country’s economy to a laissez-faire economy. Formerly closely linked with the socialist system since President Soekarno  was a Communist sympathizer and allowed the Communist Party to exist in Indonesia, it now became a capitalist system. From being a state-controlled economy, it now became a market-driven economy. This economic decontrolling materialized in a number of policies contained in the October 3, 1966 decrees.

The state eliminated the existing system of multiple exchange rates and import-export licensing controls from a large portion of the country’s international trade. The central bank announced it would sell foreign exchange at a rate to be fixed from week to week. On the same day, import licensing restrictions were greatly liberalized. In practice, importers were free to import what they wished, with the exception of certain key commodities. At the same time export procedures were simplified, and most central and regional government authorities were expressly precluded from interfering in the export trade. The effect of these actions was to remove numerous distortions from the domestic price structure and to eliminate a major source of bureaucratic and political corruption (Bresnan 1993:64-5).

This economic reform brought about significant results for several countries as well as international financial institutions supported the step. These economic policies were first outlined at a conference of representatives of the Indonesian government in Tokyo on September 19, 1966. Seven creditor countries were represented – the United States, Japan, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Australia also were represented, while Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland sent observers. Ironically, the largest single creditor, the Soviet Union, was not invited (Bresnan 1993:63).

Part of the statement presented before the creditor countries read,

For some months now a reshaping of our political structure has taken place. A new order has emerged with a pragmatic rather than doctrinaire approach in solving our nation’s problems.

Specifically, the (Consultative  Assembly) ordered the Indonesian Government to formulate and to carry out an economic stabilization programme to be preceded by an immediate rescue programme. In this respect the control of inflation receives first priority, while the rehabilitation programme is primarily concerned with the following sectors: food, infrastructure, exports and clothing.

The creation of the right social and monetary condition being uppermost in our mind, the Government has planned to introduce to this end measures which in broad outline are as follows:

• 1. by rendering a more proper role to market forces, create a wider and equal opportunity for participation in the development of our economy by all creative efforts, state and private, domestic and foreign  alike;
  2. the achievement of a balanced State Budget;
  3. pursuance of a rigid yet well-directed credit policy of the banking system;
  4. establishment of a proper link between domestic and the international economy through a realistic exchange rate, and thus creating stimuli to reverse the downward trend of the balance of payments (Financial Times, September 22, 1966, cited by Bresnan 1993:63-64 from Arndt and Panglaykim’s “Survey of Recent Developments,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies no. 4, June 1966:3-4).

These new economic policies brought about economic conditions that  increased the number of people doing business, mainly the ethnic Chinese. This period was the embryo of the so-called konglomerasi, an Indonesian term referring to the growing number of conglomerates, which would materialize as monsterous leviathans⁹ in the late 1980s and 1990s. Thus, a small number of nouveaux riches existed. These were intentionally created by the government in accordance with its “trickle down effect” theory.¹⁰

To sustain development, the New Order created what is known as the Five Year Development Plan or Pelita (Pembangunan Lima Tahun) in 1969. Different emphases were given to different Pelita in accordance with the development needs during that time period. For example, early Pelita gave emphasis to agricultural development while the latter Pelita shifted to industrialization with export orientation. With the Pelita the government started new and rational state budget management that began in April and ended in March the following year. The Ministry of Finance and the Agency for National Development Planning or Bappenas (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional) acted as “the guardian of public treasury,” while other departments acted as “the spending advocates” (Mas’oed 1989:186). The budgeting process can be elaborated as follows:

1. The process is begun with the preparation of a “project proposal list” (DUP, Daftar Usulan Proyek) by every unit in the governmental body during July and August every year. The DUP is then sent to the guardian for further review;
2. During September-October, the guardian gives assessment to various DUPs and conducts meetings with officials from the concerned departments;
3. After knowing the planned development investment, the government begins its diplomacy to obtain foreign aid, with Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) as the major donor institution;
4. In early January every year the President proposes the State Budget (RAPBN) in the form of a bill to the House which is usually accepted without significant change. After approval by the House, the President signs the bill, and it thus becomes State Budget Law. The next phase is the budget spending;
5. The development budget spending begins with the submission of a “project filling list” (DIP, Daftar Isian Proyek) by departments and governmental agencies to the Minister of Finance and Bappenas Chairman based on the DUP received previously;
6. The departments through a tender procedure choose contractors to execute the projects. The contractors could be state-owned  or private companies (Mas’oed 1989:186-7).

The IGGI gave aid to Indonesia in two forms, projects and programs. As its name implies, the project covers a wide range of development projects, while the program consists of credits for food and other selected commodities. In the beginning, as there were only a few projects, program aid dominated: in 1969-70 the commitment for the program was $320 million, with $180 million for projects. But in 1972-73 the commitment for program aid was $320 while projects amounted to $350 million (May 1978:342).

The New Order’s rise to power, as well as its endurance, was supported by at least two elements, internal and external factors. The internal factors include sweeping supports from students, intellectuals and armies. The external factors are foreign political and financial supports. Political support was also provided by the United States government fearing that the Communists would take over the power as President Soekarno allowed the PKI to grow. Financial support came from international financial institutions including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB).

With its success in stabilizing the country in both economy and security, the new regime depoliticized people (Mackie 1993:77) in order to maintain stability. The government rhetoric claimed politics was something “evil” which could not bring prosperity. This was a contrast to the previous government which had made politics a priority while at the same time ignoring economic development. Depoliticization took place in the form of repression and threats by the state. Participation in politics made one always suspect as a “dissenter,” while daring to criticize the government meant “subversive” or “PKI,” the terms which directly victimized the Old Order government. At the village level people were barred from actively participating in politics, which was known as the “floating mass” (massa mengambang). The “floating mass” practice included the isolation of people in the villages from party politics except just prior to the five year General Election.

The regime’s success in maintaining stability was possible because of the repressive military support. Bureaucracy was militarized with most positions filled by military officers, from the presidential post to the village level lurah or kepala desa.¹¹ This militarization turned the country into one of the worst abusers of human rights. There was no freedom of speech. A critical press was regarded as a potential threat to the state which could ruin the stability. Some brave enough to criticize the government were banned and barred from operating. Political, human rights and environmental activists who held protests were arrested and thrown into jail. Stories about killings and torture by the military were rampant and regarded as normal in the name of “stability” and “economic growth.”

The oil bonanza of 1971-74 put the national economy at the peak of its growth. However, prior to this lucky period, export commodities in several non-oil and gas sectors had increased which also fueled the engine of growth. OPEC increased the oil price from around  US$3 to US$12 per barrel in 1973-4; and later to over US$33 in 1979-80 (Mackie 1993:85).

The paradox in this period is, while on one hand economic growth had brought about prosperity to the people, but on the other hand the state had become more and more repressive to maintain security and stability. The New Order regime argued that without stability the country would not be able to overcome economic backwardness. Development slogans filled all types of media. The state became the “stabilizer” in a bid to pursue a “just and welfare state.” Almost every day radio and television stations, as well as newspapers, carried such messages. People were required to accept this “episteme” created by the ruler. Otherwise, they could be sent to jail.

According to several intellectuals, up to this point, the state not only controlled how the people should behave to maintain such an economic performance through stability, but also how they should “think” and “understand” reality. Through the media the state created discourses it expected to be mainstream. Through the development jargon people were forced to swallow messages with which they sometimes — even frequently –  disagreed. To use historian Taufik Abdullah’s terminology, the state had applied a “hegemony of meaning” over the people through jargon (in Latief and Ibrahim, ed. 1996). This “hegemony of meaning” was the way the government controlled consciousness of the people who in turn could not but accept any programs promoted.

The Decay and the Fall of the Regime

Samuel P. Huntington’s thesis (1968) may best describe the fall of Soeharto from power in 1998 following massive nationwide protests which destabilized the country. Soeharto’s success with economic development resulted in a middle class and a few nouveaux riches. Nationwide, quality of life improved, and the literacy rate grew, accompanied by greater demands for political participation and openness. Along with this economic success, in the early 1990s President Soeharto began to change his leadership strategy by opening wider space for freedom of speech. This keterbukaan (openness) may be compared with Gorbachev’s glasnost in the former Soviet Union. This new policy was hailed enthusiastically by the people at large. Control over the press was eased, critical artists – though still required to have licenses to perform — were no longer tightly controlled. Intellectuals in a few seminars and forums with limited audiences dared to criticize several government policies, mainly those related to the wide gap between the rich and the poor.

This openness did not last long. The government again applied tight control over freedom of speech. In 1994 the Ministry of Information banned the licenses of three leading critical publications, namely Tempo (Time) and Editor magazines, as well as Detik (Second) tabloid.¹² These publications were well-known for their investigative reporting. Tempo, prior to the ban, reported the purchase of several secondhand warships from Germany, a deal which was allegedly full of corrupt practices involving a number of high-ranking officials. The new openness seemed to have threatened the government with critical views. Tight control had again showed that obviously the country’s economic growth was not followed by adequate political participation for the people.

This gap, according to Huntington, could create destabilization. He argues that “economic development itself is a highly destabilizing process and that the very changes which are needed to satisfy aspirations in fact tend to exacerbate those aspirations” (Huntington 1968:49). Thus, rapid economic development,

• 1. disrupts traditional social groupings (family, class, caste), and thus increases “the number of individuals who are déclassé … and who are thus in circumstances conducive to revolutionary protest;¹³
  2. produces nouveaux riches who are imperfectly adjusted to and assimilated by the existing order and who want political power and social status commensurate with their new economic position;
  3. increases geographical mobility which again undermines social ties, and, in particular, encourages rapid migration from rural areas to cities, which produces alienation and political extremism;
  4. increases the number of people whose standard of living is falling, and thus may widen the gap between rich and poor;
  5. increases the incomes of some people absolutely but not relatively and hence increases their dissatisfaction with the existing order;
  6. requires a general restriction of consumption in order to promote investment and thus produces popular discontent;
  7. increases literacy, education, and exposure to mass media, which increase aspirations beyond levels where they can be satisfied;
  8. aggravates regional and ethnic conflicts over the distribution of investment and consumption;
  9. increases capacities for group organization and consequently the strength of group demands on government, which the government is unable to satisfy (Huntington 1968:49-50).

Almost all of these nine conditions occurred in the country prior to the regime’s collapse in 1998. This economic growth can be likened to a hydraulic pump that added energy to social unrests. There were sweeping criticisms and complaints about the fact that there were only a few channels for political aspirations.

The top-down management could be found anywhere in the country. The so-called “patrimonial” and “paternalistic” practice of governance was rampant. It was almost impossible to find a pure idea that arose from the bottom and was then adopted by the top management. This type of governance was a reflection of Soeharto’s authoritarian and militaristic regime that assumed that security and tight control over the people would sustain economic growth.

The 1997 General Election was again won by the ruling party Golkar (Golongan Karya or Functional Group). In the March 1998 MPR (People’s Consulative Assembly) General Session, the highest body, Soeharto was again elected as the President, for the sixth consecutive time. But since April protests spearheaded by students demanding that Soeharto step down had prevailed nationwide. The military repressed the protests which frequently ended with bloody violence. The killing of three Trisakti University students accelerated the fall of Soeharto from power. The protests formerly only done by students now involved people on the street. Jakarta turned violent with the persecution of the more prosperous ethnic Chinese. Indigenous people attacked ethnic Chinese believing that the economic pie had only been enjoyed by these few minorities. Some believed that this ethnic Chinese persecution had nothing to do with racial hatred, but was merely related to the economic jealousy.¹⁴ Pressures for Soeharto to step down grew with the increasing scale of violence. Since May 19 the students had occupied the MPR building. Soeharto offered to reshuffle his cabinet to save his power, but the resignation of 14 key ministers ended his dream. On the morning of May 21 Soeharto announced his resignation, broadcast nationwide by TV and radio stations.

Huntington’s thesis argues that rapid economic growth might potentially destabilize a country. In the case of Indonesia, however, it can be said that the Asian economic crisis was the most significant factor that led to the decay of the regime with its inability to solve it. The crisis was preceded by the rupiah currency decreasing in value against the US dollar. In June 1997, the rupiah was still around Rp2,200 per US dollar, but the next month currency was unable to stand against the “domino effect” of the regional currency crisis generated by Thailand’s baht’s tumbling down. The rupiah’s value decreased slowly to levels of Rp2,300, Rp2,500, Rp3,000, and Rp5,000. In a few months the currency’s value again tumbled to Rp7,000. The worst condition the currency had ever experienced was when it reached the level of Rp17,000.

This currency devaluation brought about skyrocketing prices which hit people’s low purchasing power. When the currency crisis could not be handled, it impacted the economy which in turn caused an economic crisis. This economic crisis created massive bankruptcy among companies which had to import their raw materials. The decreasing value of the rupiah meant that they needed more rupiah to purchase the materials whose prices were in dollars. With bankruptcy, massive layoffs occurred everywhere which hit to social stability. A widespread unemployment was thus unavoidable.

The economic crisis created a nationwide panic since all goods prices could no longer be afforded by the people at large. The crime rate increased, number of unemployed jumped. The country that formerly had claimed success in reducing the number of people living below the poverty line no longer could be proud of the achievement, as the number of poor people again swelled.

The development that the New Order was always proud of was suddenly extinct. Previously the IMF and the World Bank praised Indonesia for its success, moreover it was always able to pay its loans on time. But the crisis dissolved the pride, and all of the development successes became a mirage. In this condition a wave of unhappy feeling that could not be barred by the autocratic regime grew. In March nobody would dare to predict what would happen in May. Soeharto’s days were numbered. And May 21, 1998 became Doomsday for his power that led the country to a transition toward democracy.

Concluding Remarks

Different from what happened (or is happening) in Africa where “the problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place” (Ake 1996:1), in Indonesia, development had been on the agenda of the ruling regime as well as the technocrats that accompanied it. The Indonesian development problem lies in the absence of good governance with corruption prevalent, lack of accountability, and poor transparency. The creation of the Pelita or Five Year Development Plan was the most important program in terms of development. This Pelita had improved the people’s quality of life, income per capita, and other economic indicators. The economic growth could be maintained at the level of seven to eight percent per year. But since the state practiced what is known as “crony capitalism,” only a handful of people really enjoyed the development’s pie. Thus, we can say that the problem was poor economic equality at the expense of high economic growth. Since the early 1990s a few intellectuals¹⁵ have criticized this economic gap arguing that it was a time bomb that could explode anytime because of social jealousy. This warning materialized in the May riots that led to Soeharto’s fall.

This “crony capitalism” was possible because of the absence of good governance. Businessmen ruled, while the bureaucrats became their servants who could be bribed. This problem, according to several proponents of neo liberalism, made the economy and development inefficient which in turn affected the economic fundamentals. That is why when the monetary crisis hit the country in 1997, Indonesia did not bounce back as quickly as did Singapore and Malaysia. Rather, it turned into a prolonged economic crisis which still exists today.

Doubtless U.S. government aid to Indonesia as well as that of other donor institutions is part of their interest to promote democracy (Carothers 1999). However, in this post-Soeharto regime Indonesia’s transition toward democracy is costly. Some believed that the violence which sparked across the archipelago is a sign of potential disintegration, mainly after the independence of East Timor. Skeptics see that Indonesia, with its  more than 13,000 islands – the largest archipelagic nation in the world, and its 220 million people, will no longer exist if this transition fails to run smoothly. Stability no longer exists. Euphoria towards democracy generated chaotic conditions which promise nothing for economic recovery. Thus, few spoke of development in this post-Soeharto era as it is not a “sexy” topic. All energy is spent enjoying democracy and the political turmoil it brings about.

Although the country has a new designation as the third largest democracy in the world, after India and the U.S., it will still take a long time to make it a culture which can educate its people and lift them from their backwardness. Today the House has become the government’s control, a role that was impossible in the Soeharto era. However this “checks and balances” role of the House has sometimes created turmoil as it brought about conflict with the President. Recently President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first democratically elected President, was given a memorandum by the House for two alleged corruption practices. This memorandum potentially could lead to a Special Session that could oust the President. The conflict between the House and President who victimized economic recovery program was thus sharpened. The IMF has suspended its aid several times. The government’s credibility is now at stake.

References Cited

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Bresnan, John

1993 Managing Indonesia. New York: Columbia University Press.

Carothers, Thomas

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Crouch, Harold

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Huntington, Samuel P.

1968 Political Order in Changing Societies. New York: Yale University.

Mackie, Jamie

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Mas’oed, Mohtar

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May, Brian

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McDonald, Hamish

1980 Suharto’s Indonesia. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii.

Mody, Nawaz B.

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Robison, Richard

• 1. Politics and Markets in Indonesia’s Post-oil Era in Gerry Rodan et al., ed., “The Political Economy of South-East Asia.” Oxford University Press: Melbourne.

Schwarz, Adam

2000 A Nation in Waiting. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Tempo (Time) Magazine, January 29, 2001